In Content Centric Networking (CCN), "publish-request-response" is presented in data communications between users and publishers, as well as the response message could be cacheable in the routing node. Based on this model, privacy disclosure is a threat to users and publishers. In this paper, a strategy for CNN privacy information protection is proposed. This system adopts hybrid encryption method which can take advantage of nodes ubiquitous cache in CCN. At the same time, it ensures fewer numbers of symmetric keys, which can minimize cache overhead. In addition, this paper puts forward the construction of anonymous group, which can hide the real signer and protect the identity of it.
INTRODUCTION
In order to adapt to the increasing demand for data access, scholars at home and abroad have begun to study future network [1] . The FIA and FIND research projects initiated by the National Science Foundation (NSF) focused on the Content Centric Network (CCN) for the first time. Compared with the traditional Internet, CCN can provide storage and computing functions, also can regulate the content of resources and management [2] . The data communication in the CCN adopts the mode of "publish-request-response". All packets can be cached in the node, if different users request the same content, the cached node can send cached content to the users, which can greatly improve the efficiency of the transmission network.
One of the hotspot is the security mechanism, CCN data packets carrying the contents of the publisher's signature, may expose the identity of the publisher's privacy information [3] . Because the interest package and the data itself are closely related, the attacker may obtain the interest package from the publisher to request the corresponding content, which can result in the disclosure of user privacy. In addition, due to the cache characteristics of the node, it may cause serious content data privacy disclosure. In order to solve the problems of CCN privacy disclosure, Qi Li et al. [4] proposed a strategy to define the security level of content information. The routing nodes judge whether the content is cached according to the security level.
Nabeel M et al. [5] used the method of encrypting data by using holomorphic encryption algorithm. Random packets are used to encrypt interest packets and data packets, which can prevent unauthorized access. However, this scheme has a large computational cost. Mohaisen A et al. [6] proposed to increase response time to protect the cache privacy, but it would bring additional response delay and reduce the network transmission performance. Silva R S D et al. [7] proposed a content data access control mechanism by using attribute encryption algorithm, which needs to configure a trusted proxy server. Feng T et al. [8] proposed bidirectional anonymous identity-based ring signcryption for multiple receiver's scheme. But encryption and decryption process are complex, will lead to a large data transmission delay. Seo S C et al. [9] used a hybrid encryption algorithm to encrypt the message, so that the attacker can't crack access to the content of the message. The disadvantage is that routers need to store a large number of keys.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section II proposes a model governing the relationship between user, publisher, and routing node. Section III presents a privacy policy based on anonymous group. Section IV is protocol security analysis. Section V summarizes this paper.
SYSTEM MODEL
In CCN, the contents of the request are independent of location. Both the caching node and the content publisher can respond to the request packets scented by users. The corresponding data packet will be forwarded to the user along the opposite path of the interest packet to complete the data communication.
The packet in CCN contains identity and signature information of the publisher. In the identity-based cryptosystem, the requester uses information that uniquely identifies itself as the public key, the public key is sent to the private key generator (PKG) [10] . PKG generates the user's private key and sends it back to the requester. Based on the idea of private key generation, this paper builds an encrypted abstract model. This section describes the CCN's cryptographic abstraction model, which consists of users, publisher, PKG, and all routing nodes in CCN.
User: user has a valid identity ID and requests and accesses the data in the CCN network by sending interest packets.
Publisher: Generates and owns content packages. PKG: the generation and distribution of private keys and the generation of various system parameters during the anonymous authentication process.
Routing Node: A routing node in a CCN network has the capability to forward and cache arbitrary packets.
PRIVACY POLICY BASED ON ANONYMOUS GROUP
The privacy protection strategy proposed in this paper includes three parts: anonymous group establishment, interest packet encryption and packet signature.
Before elaborating the specific implementation methods, the meanings of the symbols used in this paper are given in Table I . The meanings of the symbols are as follows: 
Anonymous Groups Establishment
Step 1: Anonymous group G is established by using all the nodes in the one-hop communication area of the interest packet sent by the user as the first layer sub-node.
Step 2: Add G to Group (G) to update the set of nodes in the anonymous group.
Step 3: Update the remaining set of nodes: R=R-Group (G).
Step 4: determines whether the node in R is completely contained in Group (G). If R ≠ ∅, continue to repeat steps 1 ~ 3. If R = ∅, then all the nodes in the CCN network have been partitioned to get the set of anonymous group: Group (G) = {G1, G2, G3... Gj}.
When the anonymous groups are established, the entire CCN is divided into anonymous groups of different sizes. Each anonymous group contains several nodes. In the process of partitioning, each node is divided at most once. The specific process is that user randomly selects two anonymous groups Gm and Gn before sending the interest packets to obtain the group public keys of Gm and Gn, and then encrypts the interest packets sent by the user, and then forwards the encrypted interest packets to the next hop node, the encrypted interest packets are decrypted in plaintext after passing through the nodes in the two anonymous groups. The plaintext interest packet may be forwarded to a node that has the content requested by the interest packet, or may be forwarded to the source server to obtain the requested packet. In general, the first layer of sub-node will receive the interest packet broadcast spread to the second layer, the second layer and then broadcast the spread until the interest of the packet relay to the cache node or content publishers. There are multiple paths from interest packets to cache node or source server, one can be chosen to get corresponding data packets. Assume that there are n nodes in CCN, and denote j anonymous groups in CCN with Group (G) = {G1, G2, G3… Gj}, where 1≤j≤n. IDG= {ID1, ID2… IDj} is assigned to each anonymous group that has been divided. By executing the hash algorithm on IDG, H (IDG) is generated as the group public key. By sending the group public key to the PKG, the group private key of each group is generated and sent to all anonymous groups through the security channel. Each group exposes its group public key, and keeps its group private key secret.
Interest Package Encryption
The user randomly selects two adjacent anonymous groups Gm and Gn in the PKG public list of anonymous groups, where Gm, Ungroup(G), before sending the request message to the content publisher. Then, the user generates two symmetric keys ka and kb, adds ka and kb to the interest packets, encrypts the interest packets with the group public key of Gm and Gn to obtain the encrypted interest packets:INT=Gm(Qpkm((kb||ka)||Gn (Qpkn (ka ||Int)))).
Packet Signatures
Each content publisher has its own identity IDp, executes Hash algorithm to obtain H(IDp) as the public key, and sends the public key to the PKG. PKG calculates the private key of the publisher and sends it to the publisher through the security channel. When sending the return packet, the publisher uses his own private key to sign the contents of the packet to get the signed packet Datap:Datap=Gn (Int||data)||Sigp.
The implementation of privacy policy
In the Figure 1 , we can see all the encryption steps:
Step (1): The user sends the interest packet INT to the node in the CCN network. Gm is used as the prefix character to denote the anonymous group. When the interested packet arrives at any node in Gm, it uses the group private key of Gm group to encrypt the interest packets are decrypted to obtain: INTm=Gn (Qpkn (ka||Int)). Next, INTm is sent to the next anonymous group, and kb and ka are recorded in the node's cache space.
Step (2): When INTm arrives at any node in Gn, the encrypted interest packet is decrypted by using the group private key of Gn group to get: ka||Int. Record ka to the node's cache and query whether there is any data content matched with Int in the cache inside the node. If there is, it will return the matched content packet to the user according to the original path, otherwise send Int to the next node.
Step (3): In the following forwarding process, the interest packet Int is searched for in the CS, PIT and FIB of the node until it reaches the caching node or the content publisher to obtain the requested packet.
Step (4): The data packet contains the interested packet, the message content, the signature of the sender and the embedded data packet with Gn as the prefix character to get the Datap. The content publisher sends Datap to the nodes in CCN. Figure 1 . Encryption mechanism diagram.
Step (5): When the packet arrives at any of the nodes in Gn, the Datap is stored in the buffer of the node, then the packet is encrypted with ka, the encrypted packet is embedded with Gm as the prefix character, and the packet Signed the entire packet to get the Datan: Datan= Gm(Eka (Int||data||Sigp))||Sign. Send Datan to the next anonymous group.
Step (6): When the packet arrives at any node in Gm, the data packet is decrypted with the symmetric key ka, which is stored in the buffer space, and the decrypted data packet is stored in the buffer of the node. Then use kb and ka to encrypt the data packet, and sign the whole packet with the group private key of the group where the node is located to get Datam: Datam=Ekb(Eka ( Int||data||Sigp))||Sigm.
Step (7): the user receives the data packet Datam, respectively, using pkm and pkn to verify Sigm, Sign, and then using the symmetric keys kb and ka to decrypt data packets. The data packets are decrypted in turn: DEkb,ka=Int||data||Sigp . And then verify Sigp, if correct, user can get the requested data.
PROTOCOL SECURITY ANALYSIS
This paper proposes an improved privacy protection strategy, which draws on the idea of mixed encryption, and realizes the privacy protection of communication content. The security of this section from the following analysis strategies:
(1) Dibenedetto S et al. [9] used all routing nodes in the network as anonymous nodes, and all nodes can sign the packet, which may expose the privacy of the signer's identity. In this paper, the building of anonymous groups, the division of the specific steps are given. All the routing nodes in the network are divided into a finite number of anonymous groups. Each anonymous group of all nodes can be as anonymous routing nodes, and any one node can use the group's private key to sign the packet. When the verifier to verify the signature, it is only able to judge which anonymous group of the signer belongs to, but it is unable to certain the specific member of the group. According to the strategy, the signature node may cache the packet. If the attacker fined the signer, he will have the chance to get the data. Therefore, compared with the strategy of [9] , the construction of anonymous groups proposed in this paper can effectively protect the identity information of the signer. (2) An asymmetric encryption method is used in this paper. Even if attacker gets encrypted communication content through tapping, he cannot crack the text in a certain amount of time. In addition, because the data cache inside the router node is constantly updating based on the popularity of the content, even if attacker has cracked the text, the content may be invalidated to lose any meaning.
(3) The encryption method proposed in the literature [6, 7] can protect the privacy of content, but it cannot play the advantage of the universal cache of nodes. The strategy of this paper does not add extra time delay to response time, and there is also no additional proxy servers. So it can give full play to the cache feature of nodes. In this paper, if an attacker has eavesdropped on a user's encrypted request package near the user, and then sent the request package to CCN to disguise as a legitimate user. The returned packet is also encrypted with the signature, so that the attacker is still unable to obtain any data. In addition, due to the cache characteristics of CCN nodes, data packet can be sent by source server, also can be sent by the nodes that have cached the data. Therefore, attacker cannot accurately judge the source of the message. After two layers encryption, neither interest packet nor data packet, could be associated with sending source. Compared with the literature [4] , the strategy of this paper can achieve unlink ability between communication content and both sides of communication.
It can be seen from the Table II that the anonymous routing node 1 in the literature [9] stores 4 symmetric keys in the internal cache, and the anonymous routing node 2 stores 2 symmetric keys in the internal cache. In this paper, two symmetric keys are stored in the internal cache of anonymous routing node 1, and one symmetric key is stored in the internal cache of the anonymous routing node 2. By the data in table 2, it can be seen that the proposed hybrid encryption strategy paper uses less symmetric keys, which reducing the burden of router storage keys and having less cache overhead. In addition, in the literature [9] , users should maintain the four symmetric keys. In this paper, users only need to maintain two symmetric keys, so it can reduce the burden of user maintenance keys.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, first of all, the construction of anonymous group is given, and then specific steps are given. All the routing nodes in CCN are divided into a finite number of anonymous groups. By assigning the group ID to each anonymous group, PKG generates the group of each group private key. Each node in an anonymous group can act as an anonymous routing node. Any node can use the group's private key to sign the packet. When verifier verifies the signature, it can only determine the signer of the packet belong to which anonymous group, but cannot determine which group is a specific member. Therefore, the construction of anonymity group proposed in this paper can effectively protect the identity of the signer. The strategy of this paper achieves integrity and authenticity of the content data, and realizes privacy protection of the content. In addition, due to the caching characteristics of CCN nodes, packets can be sent by source server or by caching node. Therefore, attacker cannot accurately judge the source of message. After two layers encryption, neither interest packet nor data packet, could be associated with sending source. The strategy can make communication content and communication between the two sides not be linked. This paper uses fewer symmetric keys, which can reduce the burden of the router maintaining keys and have less cache overhead. Users only need to maintain two symmetric keys, which reduces the burden of user maintaining keys.
